Abstract
When would politicians constrain their own discretion in the distribution of valued benefits to voters? I argue that the answer lies in the partisan attachment of voters. Politicians would be more likely to abjure discretion in places where voters evince weak attachment to political parties. In this context, non-discretionary rules enhance incumbents’ electoral support in two ways: first, they allow benefits to reach unattached voters without angering their loyal supporters who might otherwise expect to be favored; second, they signal incumbents’ commitment to unbiased distribution of public benefits. I find strong support for this claim using survey data on allocations of the Members of Parliament development funds in Ghana. Allocations of these funds are significantly more likely to be rule-based in districts where partisan attachments are weak. This result is robust to controls for alternate explanations and provides a new answer to the debate on when politicians would implement reforms designed to reduce or eliminate political discretion.

Keywords: Discretionary, Non-discretionary, Common Fund, District Assembly, Non-programmatic

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Introduction

A large body of research on politics in developing countries suggests that politicians tend to distribute material benefits to potential supporters through clientele networks (Diaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni 2012; Gans-Morse, Mazzuca, and Nichter 2009; Gans-Morse, Mazzuca, and Nichter 2009; Nichter 2008; Stokes and Dunning 2008; Stokes 2005; Stokes et al. 2013). By controlling the levers of public spending, politicians can use their discretion, especially in contexts of weak formal institutions, to channel valued public resources to certain voters and maximize their chances of reelection.

In Africa’s new democracies in particular, discretionary or non-programmatic distribution of public resources, notably clientelism, is presumed to be more effective for winning votes and hence more attractive to politicians for many reasons. First, poverty is widespread in the region and research suggests that poor voters are more likely to respond favorably to clientelism (Magaloni, Diaz-Cayeros, and Estévez 2007; Wantchekon 2003); second, incumbent politicians may have a strong incentive to reward or favor their co-ethnics or their clients in the distribution of public benefits because voters are typically assumed to vote along ethnic lines or based on clientelist networks (Nugent 2001; Posner 2005); third, distribution of public benefits through clientele or other social networks is probably the most feasible option for politicians partly because the cultivation of personal relationships and dependence on those relationships for survival is widespread and deeply rooted in the region (e.g. Hyden 2012); moreover, political parties are programmatically weak and lack the organizational capacity to effectively deliver public services when they win power (e.g. van de Walle 2003). Social networks therefore serve as natural channels for governments to extend basic services to,
and make their presence felt among citizens across the country. Thus when much of Africa transitioned to democracy in the early 1990s, some scholars argued that if political competition grows, clientelism and other forms of discretionary or non-programmatic distribution of public resource will dominate politics (van de Walle 2007).

In the last decade or more, multiparty elections in a growing number of Africa’s new democracies have become more competitive. Studies on African elections show that at the end of 2010, more than 60 percent of countries in the region had conducted three or more successive elections without interruptions and about 30 percent had experienced executive and/or legislative turnovers (Weghorst and Lindberg 2013; Lindberg 2009b). Yet over this period, more and more governments in the region and the developing world in general, have initiated programs to transfer cash and provide complementary public services, notably healthcare and basic education services directly to citizens using purely economic and technical criteria. In fact more than 120 of these programs were implemented in sub-Saharan Africa between 2000 and 2009 (e.g. Garcia and Moore 2012). Studies on a number of these programs show that political criteria play no role in predicting who does or does not receive benefits (Fried 2012; La O 2013). Some scholars speculate that the rising popularity among politicians of targeted, rule-based public transfers to citizens in the developing world is indicative of a potential decline of clientelism or non-programmatic distributive politics in those countries (Stokes et al. 2013). Moreover, the last 15 or more years have also seen the introduction of Constituency Development Funds (CDFs) in many developing countries with increasing involvement of Members of Parliament (MPs) in grassroots development. CDFs are

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1 It is worth noting that even though the criteria used in selecting beneficiaries are politically neutral, incumbent parties tend to benefit electorally from these transfers (e.g. Zucco 2013).
Moneys drawn from national revenues and allocated to MPs to enable them undertake development projects in their electoral districts. Cross-national analysis of these programs reveals significant variations in the degree of control and mechanisms of distribution of CDF benefits by MPs (Tshangana 2012). Whereas in some countries the CDF law gives MPs maximum control over the management and allocation of CDFs, in others MPs have approved or amended these laws to reduce or eliminate their own influence on distribution. For instance Kenya’s CDF legislation has been revised twice since its introduction in 2003. The original legislation, enacted in 2003, gave MPs near absolute control over the management and distribution of CDF benefits to their constituents. In the most recent (2013) revision, MPs approved a new law that significantly constrains their own ability influence the actual allocation of CDF benefits.2

Within countries, and especially in those where CDF legislations leave MPs with a great deal of discretionary power – e.g. Ghana, Uganda, and Zambia among others – the approaches used in allocating CDF benefits to constituents also vary across individual MPs. For instance although Ghanaian MPs are largely unconstrained by the formal guidelines for spending their share of the District Assemblies Common Fund, some MPs have introduced structures and rules that essentially curb their own ability to influence the actual allocations.3 The most popular approach involves setting up a professional and often less partisan fund management body to handle all aspects of the allocations using

2 http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/MPs-vow-to-change-CDF-law--to-give-themselves-more-clout/-/1064/1849878/-/cbwcw3z/-/index.html

3 The MPs share of the District Assemblies Common Fund is Ghana’s equivalent of the CDFs as they are known elsewhere.
mainly economic and sometimes technical criteria. In places where they exist, these management bodies are responsible for vetting all requests for development projects and other forms of assistance and approving disbursements to communities and individuals that meet the established criteria.

Non-discretionary or rule-based distribution of valued benefits to voters by politicians, especially in the context of growing political competition seems inconsistent with predictions of standard models of distributive politics. Standard theories expect politicians to use their power, sometimes including manipulating or overriding formal rules, to channel resources to the “right voters” and maximize their chances of reelection (Golden and Min 2013). Why would politicians design policies and allocate valued resources to voters in ways that reduce or eliminate their own discretion? I address this question in this paper. This question is particularly important in Africa’s new democracies where formal institutions are not very strong and economic and social conditions create political incentives that are more compatible with discretionary allocations of public resources. The question is also important for some normative reasons. A large number of impact evaluation studies shows that rule-based public transfers to citizens are effective in reducing extreme poverty and vulnerability in developing countries, one of the issues on the top of the global social policy agenda since the turn of the century (Barrientos and DeJong 2006; Devereux and Pelham 2005;

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4 For instance most MPs fund higher education for brilliant but needy constituents; to receive support, students must have obtained a certain minimum score in the final high school exam, which serves as entrance exam to colleges, and they must also demonstrate need.

5 Regarding the determination of economic need of communities, the work of these management bodies, where they exist, is made easier because as part of Ghana’s Poverty Reduction Strategy process, all districts in the country maintain detailed poverty profiles and maps of all communities, which is updated on a regular basis.
Farrington and Slater 2006; Jones, Vargas, and Villar 2008). Some analysts also argue that since cash transfers reduce the accumulation of wealth at the center of political power, they could potentially reduce the negative effects of natural resource wealth on governance in new democracies (Moss 2011). I propose and test an argument on the sources of non-discretionary distributive politics in Africa’s new democracies, focusing on how the distribution of voter attachments to political parties affect politicians’ decisions about how to distribute benefits.

**Literature: Voter Behavior**

Voters may develop strong attachments to, and vote consistently for, certain parties for many reasons including ideology, social identity or some other connection that enables them to enjoy certain benefits, including material and/or psychic benefits (Carlson 2010; Chandra 2007; Ferree 2006; Fridy 2007; Habyarimana et al. 2007). In a multiparty democratic system, voters may be classified into three broad groups: strongly attached voters, weakly attached voters, and unattached voters. Much of the literature on voter behavior often characterizes unattached and weakly attached voters as “persuadable” or “swing” (Campbell 2008; Lindberg and Morrison 2008; Lindbeck and Weibull 1987). The extent of voter attachment to political parties features prominently in the variety of approaches used to measure and evaluate the effects of “swing” or “core” voting on the behavior of politicians as well as various policy outcomes. Some of the popular measures include self-reported ambivalence or lack of party affiliation (Hoffman et al. 2009; Lindbeck and Weibull 1987), past voting behavior such as voting straight ticket or split ticket (Lindberg and Morrison 2008; Keefer and Khemani 2009), or some combination of these measures (Weghorst and Lindberg 2013). Though there is no consensus on the best
approach, unattached and weakly attached voters are conceptually distinguishable from strongly attached voters in that the voting behavior of the first two groups is presumed to be subject to greater shocks than that of the third. In other words unattached and weakly attached voters should be more likely to switch theirs votes between different parties or politicians over time than strongly attached voters.\footnote{I choose to stick to “unattached” and “weakly attached” voters and avoid using “swing voter” here because even strong party identifiers can sometimes swing-vote. The likelihood of doing so may be small but it is not zero (Weghorst and Lindberg 2013).}

The impact of the hypothesized behavior of unattached or weakly attached voters on elections, the behavior of politicians, and policy outcomes has received considerable attention in the literature (Dixit and Londregan 1996; Cox 1987; Stokes 2005; Fridy 2012; Leech 2003; Lindberg and Morrison 2005; Mayer 2008; Keefer and Khemani 2009). But extant scholarship tends to emphasize the influential role of incumbent politicians in public spending. Because they have control over public spending, incumbent politicians could disproportionately favor their own loyal voters in the distribution of public resources (Cox and McCubbins 1986); or channel benefits to unattached or weakly attached voters to persuade them and thus broaden their electoral support base (Dixit and Londregan 1996; Stokes 2005; Magaloni, Diaz-Cayeros, and Estévez 2007). They could also employ a combination of both methods as well as decide the type of goods – public or private – to provide to each group in order to maximize the number of votes they receive (e.g. Magaloni, Diaz-Cayeros, and Estévez 2007) And where possible, they can punish opposition voters by withholding services. The standard approach in the literature implicitly assumes that when faced with strong electoral contests, incumbent politicians would be more likely to maximize control over the
distribution of benefits to voters, especially in developing democracies where formal procedures are not well institutionalized. However, this is not always the case as evidenced by the rising popularity of targeted, rule-based government transfers to citizens in many developing democracies and the instances where Members of Parliament in some of these countries willingly relinquish control over the distribution of valued resources to their constituents. To be sure, much research has been done in other contexts on how competitive configurations and economic empowerment create incentives for politicians to acquiesce in reforms that reduce or eliminate political discretion over electorally useful resources (Finkel 2008; Geddes 1991; Lehoucq and Molina 2002) or opt out of clientelism and other forms of discretionary distribution of resources (e.g. Weitz-Shapiro 2012). To my knowledge, this is the first paper to examine how voter attachments to political parties affect politicians’ decisions about how to distribute benefits to voters in a developing democracy setting.

**Drivers of Non-discretionary Distributive Politics in Africa**

When would politicians willingly constrain their own ability to influence the distribution of valued benefits to voters? I argue that this would be more likely in places with large numbers of unattached and/or weakly attached voters. In this context, non-discretionary distributive rules enhance incumbents’ electoral support in at least two ways: first, they enable incumbent politicians to deliver benefits to voters outside their circle of loyal voters – i.e. to unattached or weakly attached voters – and broaden their electoral support without angering their loyal voters who may otherwise feel betrayed if they fail to receive favors. Unattached and/or weakly attached voters who gain access to valued benefits may reward the incumbent at the polls because of the benefits. However, if politicians were to
use their own discretion to channel resources to these “outsiders” in order to broaden their electoral support for the current election, they risk alienating some current loyalists in future elections (e.g. Diaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni 2012). Sticking to broad-based, impersonal resource allocation rules helps to minimize this risk. Current incumbent loyalists would be less likely to abandon their favorite party if allocations are governed by impersonal rules and the actual beneficiaries are people who are worse off than they are, compared to the situation where the party or politician disproportionately favors unattached or weakly attached voters who may be similar to them or perhaps even better than they are. Thus non-discretionary distributive rules create a convenient opportunity for incumbent politicians to shift blame for the broader outcome of the allocations and in this way circumvent their loyal voters in a relatively less offensive manner.\footnote{A former Majority Leader of Parliament in Ghana told me in an interview in 2013: “I have many supporters here and most of them do cooperate with me when, for example, they see that my resources are used to support widows and orphans, or provide water or purchase a grinding mill for a deprived community. I don’t need to explain to them; the results are there for them to see”.}

Second, non-discretionary distributive rules have a signaling effect: they allow incumbents to credibly signal to voters that they are committed to unbiased and efficient use of public resources. Fox (2007) argues that when legislators are concerned about their chances of reelection, they would be more likely to select policies that would lead the public to believe that they are unbiased. This signal helps to further broaden incumbents’ electoral support among unattached or weakly attached voters. Empirical evidence and media accounts on elections and voter behavior in Africa lend support to this claim.

Although social identities, notably ethnicity remain salient in African elections (Posner 2005; Posner 2007; Ichino and Nathan 2013), recent research shows that voting behavior.
is increasingly shaped by voters’ evaluations of the performance of incumbent politicians. Voters are more likely to cast their ballots for politicians whom they believe have performed well in areas such as overall economic management, provision of collective and developmental goods, and/or other dimensions of public service delivery that they care most about (Bratton 2013; Lindberg and Morrison 2008; Fridy 2007; Youde 2005).

However, this performance-based voting is concentrated among voters with weak partisan attachments. For instance Weghorst and Lindberg (2013) argue and show that MP performance, as measured by the provision of collective or broad-based goods to constituents, attracts swing voters in Ghana. Individual-level survey data from the Afrobarometer reveals a similar pattern. Analysis of the 2008 Afrobarometer survey data for Ghana show that respondents who approve of the public service delivery performance of their local government are more likely to say they would vote for the party in government in future elections than those who disapprove. But this effect is significant only among the subset of voters who report no affiliation to a political party (0.75 vs. 0.62, p=0.000)\textsuperscript{8}. That is, unaffiliated voters who approve of the service delivery performance of local governments are significantly more likely to cast their ballots for the incumbent party in future elections than those who disapprove. Among those who reported being close to a political party: both ruling and opposition parties, the effect is in the same direction but the magnitudes are small. Party-affiliated voters who approve of the public service delivery performance of local governments are slightly more likely to

\textsuperscript{8} Data drawn from the 3\textsuperscript{rd} round of the Afrobarometer survey in Ghana: the survey asked respondents whether they approve or disapprove of the performance of their local government. Respondents were also asked which party’s presidential candidate they would vote for if elections were held tomorrow.
vote for the party in government than those who disapproved. Because the survey only asked respondents whether they feel close to any party, not probing for strength of attachment, the apparent attrition on both sides is probably due to shifts in the voting behavior of the weakly attached voters.

I use survey data on allocations of the Members of Parliament development funds in 22 electoral districts in the Brong Ahafo region of Ghana to test the hypothesis above. The results provide strong support for my hypothesis: allocations of the MPs’ development funds are significantly more likely to be governed by broad-based, impersonal rules in districts where voters demonstrate weak attachment to political parties. This paper makes three contributions. First, this is one of the first projects to explore the political and policy implications of voter attachment to political parties in the context of a developing democracy. Keefer and Khemani (2009) argue and show that strong voter attachment to political parties reduces legislator incentives to provide constituency service in India. The paper contributes and extends this literature by focusing on Africa, where this question is relatively underexplored, and highlighting the important role of voters who are weakly attached to incumbent parties. Unattached or weakly attached voters play a significant role in shaping the behavior of politicians and hence policy outcomes. Second, the paper adds to recent research that shows that performance-based voting has increased across Africa ( Fridy 2007; Bratton 2013;  

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9 Among those affiliated with the ruling party, 98 percent of those who approve and 96 percent of those who disapprove of the policy performance of their local government say they will vote for the ruling party candidate if elections were held tomorrow. The respective percentages for those affiliated with the largest opposition party are 8 percent and 7 percent.

10 That is, some opposition party affiliates saying they would vote for the party in government and some ruling party affiliates saying they would vote for opposition parties or candidates.
Weghorst and Lindberg 2013), a region where voting in elections is often presumed to be along the lines of ethnicity, clientelism, and/or patronage. Third, it sheds light on the growing political support for targeted, rules-based distribution of public resources among politicians in developing democracies (Stokes, et al. 2013) and thus advances understanding of the conditions under which politicians would implement or acquiesce in policy and administrative reforms that reduce or eliminate political control over electorally useful resources (Geddes 1991; Lehoucq and Molina 2002; Finkel 2008; Weitz-Shapiro 2012; Magaloni, Diaz-Cayeros, and Estévez 2007).

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I describe the empirical setting, including the distribution of legislative seats in the study region. This is followed by a brief overview of the Members of Parliament development fund in Ghana and a detailed description of the survey and data collection. Next, I describe the variables and measurement and specify the empirical model. Finally, I present and discuss the results of the analysis and conclude with some implications of the findings and suggestions for future research.

**Empirical setting**

Ghana is one of the most electorally competitive new democracies in Africa. Since 2000, national elections have generally been free, fair and peaceful. Two parties dominate Ghanaian politics: the current governing National Democratic Congress (NDC) party and the main opposition New Patriotic Party (NPP) party, which was in power between 2001 and 2008. The president is directly elected in a majority-runoff system from a single national constituency, while Members of Parliament (MPs) are elected by first-past-the-post plurality electoral rules from single member districts known as constituencies.
Parliamentary and the first round of the presidential elections are held concurrently and the president and the 275-member parliament are each elected to a four-year term. The president can only serve for two terms but there is no term limit for members of parliament.

The Brong Ahafo region, one of the most competitive regions in the country, has a total of 29 electoral districts (or constituencies) and hence 29 parliamentary seats. In the December 2012 elections, the ruling NDC party won 16 seats and the main opposition NPP party took the remaining 13 seats. The survey data used for the analysis in this paper were collected in 22 of the 29 constituencies. In these constituencies, the ruling NDC party holds 10 seats and the main opposition NPP party holds 12 seats. The survey focused on allocations of development resources in the 22 districts with particular emphasis on allocations of the Members of Parliament (MPs) fund. The MP development funds are monies drawn from national revenues and allocated to MPs to enable them undertake development projects in their respective districts. Local government, known as District Assemblies in Ghana, is the level of government at which the national budget is allocated and spent. Ten percent of total national revenue is shared annually among all districts based on a formula approved by parliament. For most districts, these central government transfers are the main source of funding for development and recurrent expenditures. In fact some districts depend almost entirely on the central government transfers to finance all their development activities. Each Member of Parliament (MP) is allocated up to five percent of their respective local governments’ share of the central government transfers. The next section presents a brief overview of the MPs’ development fund in Ghana.

I was unable to cover all 29 constituencies because of logistical constraints.
The MPs Common Fund in Ghana

The Members of Parliament share of the District Assemblies Common Fund (MPDACF), known elsewhere in the development world as Constituency Development Funds (CDFs), is a significant source of funding for Ghanaian MPs. Most MPs receive between US$40,000 and US$60,000 annually from the central government transfers to local government to support the development needs of their constituents. In the context of a developing country like Ghana, these amounts are substantial. The current (2015) daily minimum wage in Ghana is about US$1.7 (i.e. 7 Ghana Cedis). Thus the annual allocation to one MP can pay the gross earnings of nearly 90 minimum wage workers for twelve months. The formal guidelines for allocating these resources leave the choice of project areas and beneficiaries to the discretion of MPs. The main requirement is that MPs must choose and execute projects and programs that are part of, or at least consistent with, the development priorities of their respective local governments, but ensuring that they do not duplicate those already completed by their local governments. However, in most cases, the projects and programs that MPs actually choose to finance are easily captured in the books in a way that fits in the local government development agenda, even if the actual purpose or outcome diverges from that agenda. For instance handing out cash to college students from the district is frequently captured under scholarships for higher education, which is almost always on the agenda of most local governments. This means that MPs have the opportunity to control and allocate these resources in ways that

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12 Author’s calculations using data on central government transfers to local governments; available at http://commonfund.gov.gh/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=282&Itemid=386
would maximize their vote shares. However, the extent of control and the mechanisms used in allocating these resources vary widely across individual MPs. While some MPs have maintained full and personal control over MPDACF allocations, others have, to different degrees, introduced structures and rules to limit their own ability to influence the actual allocations.

I argue that the distribution of voter attachments to political parties in different districts explains the variation in MPDACF allocations. I expect allocations of the MPDACF to be non-discretionary or rule-based in districts with large numbers of unattached or weakly attached voters. The MPDACF is common knowledge in Ghana; most voters know that MPs are allocated a portion of the central government transfers to local governments annually to undertake development projects in their respective districts. Beneficiaries of the MPs’ Common Fund – communities and individuals – are also often common knowledge within districts. When MPs use their Common Fund resources to finance the construction of new classroom blocks, provide safe water, or purchase new corn mills for some communities, or pay health insurance premiums and education expenses for some constituents, information on such projects become public knowledge sooner or later. In many cases, projects supported by the MPDACF are visibly labeled as such and in their campaigns, MPs actively claim credit for providing these projects. Allocations of the MPDACF therefore serve as an effective tool for MPs to credibly signal their “type” to constituents if or when they need to do so.
The Survey

The survey involved interviews with local government officials responsible for disbursing the MPDACF and a random sample of voters from each district. I hired, trained, and deployed a team of research assistants to collect detailed information on allocations of the MPDACF from local government administrators who handle the actual disbursements and to interview nearly 1000 ordinary voters selected randomly from the 22 electoral districts. I use the information provided by the district administrators to measure the extent of MPs’ discretion in the actual allocation of the MPDACF and the individual survey data to measure voter attachment to political parties.

Measuring MPs’ Discretion in MPDACF Allocations

The first survey asked local government administrators who oversee the actual disbursement of the MPDACF about the process and criteria used in selecting beneficiaries – communities and individuals – of the MPDACF. The administrators responded to a small set of close-ended background questions and also wrote out in detail, how the MPDACF is actually allocated, backed with some examples from recent allocations. I then developed simple coding rules for the narratives provided by the administrators as follows: I assign a value of 1 (largely discretionary) for descriptions that suggests that allocations of the MPDACF are mainly or largely at the discretion of the MP. These were the cases where the administrators reported that all allocation decisions rest with the MP and that s/he chooses the projects and programs to finance and also handles or oversees the actual disbursements. An example of a constituency that scored 1 is Techiman South where the administrator wrote: “The selection of beneficiary
towns and people is based on requests made to the MP”; “the MP’s own personal judgment” and “political support base”. For individual beneficiaries, the administrator wrote: “It is based on his [the MP’s] own discretion”. Six of the 22 districts reported similar approaches to the MPDACF allocations: the administrators take instructions from the MP and disburse the funds accordingly.

For districts where the administrators reported a combination of objective criteria – e.g. economic and/or technical criteria – and MPs’ personal judgments or political considerations, I coded those as 2 (partly non-discretionary). These were mainly those districts where an individual or group is tasked to conduct initial screening, using need-based criteria to identify potential beneficiaries but the MP has to approve before disbursements are made. An example is Kintampo North district where the administrator reported that allocations are based on: “Gender considerations, special needs, disability and the MP’s political support base. We disburse to these people once we get the go ahead from the honorable MP”. A little over 40 percent of the districts (9 of the 22 districts) scored a 2 on MPDACF allocations. Finally, I coded as 3 (largely non-discretionary) those cases where the description and examples suggests a limited role for the MP. Dormaa Central constituency is one such example. Here the administrator wrote: “The selection of projects for implementation is based on the Assembly’s Medium Term Development Plan.¹³ There is a committee that receives, vets, and selects beneficiaries of the MP’s share of the Common Fund”. Seven of the 22 districts scored 3 on the MPDACF allocations. I worked with two research assistants on the coding. We each

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¹³ This is a legal requirement for allocating the MPs Common Fund. MPs are required to use their Common Fund for development projects that the local government has prioritized.
coded the responses independently and then compared the results. All three correlated very highly – over 90 percent.\(^{14}\) For the few cases where there was some disagreement, we discussed each of them and came up with one that accurately reflected the content of the narratives and the examples provided by the administrators.\(^{15}\) The result of the coding of the MPDACF allocations is the outcome of interest (dependent variable) in this paper. Table 1 lists the coding results for all 22 districts.

----Table 1 about here ----

An interview with one of the MPs from the study districts prior to the survey corroborates the narratives provided by the administrator of his district. I successfully surveyed more than a dozen MPs during my visits to the Ghanaian parliament in 2013 prior to the surveys in the Brong Ahafo region. Among those interviewed was the MP for Dormaa West constituency, one of the districts that scored 2 (partly non-discretionary) on the MPDACF allocations. He was a Deputy Minister for Trade and Industry at the time. When asked about the management and distribution of the MPDACF, the MP indicated that he targets the extremely poor and vulnerable populations, notably children with disabilities and the elderly. The administrator for this district also mentioned these objective criteria in his narrative, in addition to orphans and widows; but added that in all cases, the MP has to give the go ahead before actual disbursements are made. In fact in

\(^{14}\) The correlation with my coding was 92 percent with the first research assistant and 94 percent with the second research assistant.

\(^{15}\) The disagreement was on two cases: one in which the administrator reported that applications were first submitted to the MP and s/he selects those he wishes to support for a committee to act. We agreed to code it 2 (partly discretionary) because the administrator’s comments and example suggested that the committee could reject an application based on its own investigations. The second case, which we agreed to code as 1 (discretionary), was one where requests for support were submitted to the MP’s party office; some vetting is done by the officials but the criteria used in selecting final beneficiaries were not made public. It is worth noting that the coding was driven by the content of the narratives provided by the administrators and not the personal judgments of the coders.
response to a question on his preferred approach to managing MPDACF allocations, the MP ranked “personal control” first, followed by control by “trusted party leaders”.

Voter Attachment to Parties: Main Independent Variable

The individual-level survey was face-to-face interviews with a random sample of nearly 1000 adults selected from the 22 electoral districts. The sampling proceeded as follows: the primary sampling unit was the polling station and the target sample size was 1200 voters. I followed the successful protocols used by the Afrobarometer surveys in Ghana and interviewed four respondents around each sampled polling station, which works out to 300 polling stations across the region. To draw the 300 polling stations, I first computed the share of polling stations in each electoral district in the region. I then allocated the 300 polling stations such that the share of polling stations in each district in the sample is the same as the district’s share of polling stations in the region. Finally, I used a random number generator to select the required number of polling stations from each district. At each polling station, research assistants used the random walk pattern to select four households, one at a time and then randomly select and interview one adult from each household. They were required to interview two females and two males around each polling station since the gender ratio is approximately 50:50 in the region. I programmed the data collection tool into android devices using the Open Data Kit (ODK)

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16 The other MPs I surveyed were from other regions of the country and they all reported different approaches. For instance the MP for Bawku West constituency, who was by then the Majority Leader of Parliament, reported that a fund manager handles the allocations using poverty indicators. The MP for Bantama constituency, one of the few female MPs, takes a broad-based, settlement-centered approach that emphasizes ethnicity. This approach, she said, is most effective in her case because the constituency is settle by large pockets of different ethnic groups from all over the country and they tend to band together in small localities and their priorities are often different.
platform. All responses were recorded on these devices, which were GPS enabled, allowing easy tracking of the locations of all the interviews and real time data capture.

Respondents were asked questions on access to basic public services in general and the MPDACF. They were also asked about asset ownership, contacts with key political figures in their districts, party affiliation, past voting behavior, and future voting intentions. I also collected data on respondents’ basic demographic characteristics – gender, age, ethnicity, and level of education. In this paper, I focus on respondents’ voting behavior.\(^\text{17}\) I use respondents’ self-reported voting behavior to measure the degree of voter attachment to political parties. The survey asked respondents which party’s presidential and parliamentary candidates they voted for in the last general elections. Respondents were also asked to indicate which party’s presidential and parliamentary candidates they would vote for “if elections were held tomorrow”. I classify those who have voted split ticket in past elections – i.e. voted for the presidential candidate of one party and the parliamentary candidate of a different party in the past elections – and/or intend to do so in future ones as unattached or weakly attached voters and those who reported voting straight ticket for the same party in the past and will vote the same way in future elections as strongly attached voters.

I focus on split ticket voting to measure voter attachment to political parties because in Ghana a constitutional provision incentivizes parties and presidential candidates to actively discourage it. Ghana’s 1992 constitution requires the president to appoint at least 50 percent of cabinet ministers from parliament. Since presidential and parliamentary elections are held concurrently, presidential candidates often spend a significant amount

\(^{17}\) Other questions on the survey are used in a separate analysis.
of time campaigning for their parliamentary candidates so that if elected, their party would hold majority of seats in parliament, which is helpful for governing, and also ensures that there is a large pool of good candidates for cabinet positions. For instance prior to the most recent (2012) general election, the current president, John Mahama, is reported to have said, during a campaign tour, that:

“….this time I know you are going to vote for NDC, you are going to vote for me for president, but also add my MPs so that they would support me in parliament to do the work that you want me to do for you.”18

Presidential candidates of all parties often emphasize similar messages whenever they undertake campaign tours around the country. Thus voters who are strongly attached to political parties are motivated to cast their ballots for candidates of their favorite parties in both the presidential and parliamentary contests. These voters view a vote for their party’s candidate for parliament as helping the president to execute his agenda, and they have little incentive to vote otherwise. In this context, those who vote split ticket, which in Ghana is often referred to as “skirt-and-blouse voting”, are more likely to be unattached or weakly attached voters.

For each district, I compute the proportion of unattached or weakly attached voters as the main independent variable. This measure takes values between 0 and 47.92 percent. The 0 percent occurred in one district – Sunyani East district – where all respondents reported voting straight ticket in the past and intended to vote the same way for the same parties in future ones. Higher values on this variable represent weaker partisan

attachments. I also operationalize extent of voter attachment to political parties using actual election results from each district as a robustness check. Since the first round of the presidential elections and the legislative elections are held concurrently, polling stations are usually arranged such that voters first cast the presidential ballot and then the legislative ballot before exiting the queue. Thus turnout in both elections is usually similar. For each district, I compute the absolute value of the difference between the vote share of the elected MP and the vote share of the presidential candidate of his/her party in each of the last three elections (2004, 2008 and 2012) and take the average of these values. A large gap between the elected MP and his/her presidential candidate is indicative of split ticket voting and hence weak voter attachment to political parties. This measure takes values between 0.23 percent and 5.74 percent. The two ways of measuring voters’ partisan attachment lead to similar conclusions in the analysis below.

Controls

In the analysis below, I control for MP and district characteristics. For MPs, I control for several characteristics. **Portfolio:** whether the MP holds a ministerial portfolio or has held one recently (i.e. between 2008 and 2012). MPs who are also ministers or were ministers not too long ago may have access to additional resources, which could influence how they handle allocations of the MPDACF. For instance they may relinquish control over allocations of the MPDACF because they have access to a broader range of resources that they could channel to voters they wish to favor. Ministerial and other positions of influence in government also tend to correlate strongly with personal wealth and/or capacity to attract a significant number of votes because MPs and other party members
who make substantial contributions in these ways to the party are usually the ones who get appointed to these positions.

**Margin of victory:** MPs who expect very close elections would be more concerned to attract unattached voters. Hence I include a measure of the average margin of victory in each district. I compute this variable as follows: first I compute the average margin of victory (i.e. average of the difference between the vote shares of the winner and the first runner in the legislative elections) in each district over the last three elections – i.e. 2004, 2008 and 2012. I then take the inverse of this variable by subtracting each value from the maximum so that large values reflect close elections. Inverting the margin of victory allows me to directly control for the effect of close elections.

**Distance:** MPs from districts that are far from the national and regional capitals may visit their districts less frequently and may therefore be more likely to arrange for someone or group of people in their district to handle the MPDACF allocations. To prevent abuse and/or local capture, it is probably in the interest of MPs in this situation to ensure that allocations of the MPDACF are governed by impersonal rules.

**Female:** Women MPs’ may be more passionate about poverty and vulnerability, especially among women and children and may therefore opt for targeted, nonpartisan allocations of the MPDACF in order to tackle those issues in their districts.

At the district level, I control for the following characteristics: **ethnicity**, one of the most important predictors of voting behavior in Africa (e.g. (Posner 2007; Ferree 2006; Ferree 2004; Ichino and Nathan 2013). I include a dichotomous variable that takes a value of 1 if the MP is from the dominant ethnic group in the district and 0 otherwise. Based on the
most recent (2010) census data, the Akan ethnic group is dominant in most districts in the Brong Ahafo region. Only four of the 22 districts are dominated by other ethnic groups: the Guans are the dominant group in Sene East and Sene West districts; the Mole-Dagomba ethnic group dominates Kintampo North; and the Ga-Adangme group dominates Kintampo South. In each district, the census data show that the dominant groups make up more than 50 percent of the population. Since legislative elections are based on plurality rules, MPs who are members of the dominant group in their districts may have a strong incentive to disproportionately favor their co-ethnics in the distribution of valued benefits. Thus allocation of the MPDACF is likely to be based on political discretion.

**District wealth:** Extant scholarship suggests that when voters become rich, they will demand efficient use of public resources and may therefore punish politicians who engage in clientelism and other forms of non-programmatic distribution of public resources (Weitz-Shapiro 2012). There are no independent and comparable measures of overall district wealth in Ghana so I use the proportion of the district population that is educated above high school as a proxy. A large concentration of highly educated people is likely to correlate strongly with overall wealth of the district.
Explaining The Sources of Non-discretionary Distributive Politics in Ghana

To examine the effect of voter attachment to political parties on resource allocation by MPs, I estimate the following model using ordered logistic regression analysis.

\[ MPDACF_{allocationi} = b_0 + b_1 \text{SplitTicket}_i + b_2 \text{Avgmargin}_i + b_3 \text{MPportfolio}_i + b_4 \text{Distance}_i + b_5 \text{MPfemale}_i + b_6 \text{MPEthnicity}_i + b_7 \text{Wealth}_i + \epsilon_i \]

The ordered logistic approach is appropriate in this case because the dependent variable, \textit{MPDCF allocations}, takes three (ordered) values: 1, 2, and 3, representing Discretionary, Partly Non-discretionary, and Non-discretionary respectively. Thus higher values represent less discretionary allocation of the MPDCF. Table 2 lists the summary statistics of all the variables used in the analysis.

Table 2: Summary Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MPDCF Allocation</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Split Ticket Voters</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22.63</td>
<td>13.96</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>47.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Split Ticket Voting (actual election results)*</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2.94</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>5.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP Portfolio</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance from regional capital (km)</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>83.77</td>
<td>49.29</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>222.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP from dominant ethnic group</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent more than high school</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12.53</td>
<td>5.79</td>
<td>6.12</td>
<td>33.35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The alternative operationalization of the main independent variable

Results

Table 3 presents the estimates using the specification above. The dependent variable is the ordered MPDCF allocation criteria. The main independent variable is the proportion of split ticket voters – uncommitted and/or weakly committed voters – in each district as described above. In each model, I cluster the standard errors at the district
level. The results are consistent with the hypothesis above: increasing concentration of unattached or weakly attached voters significantly increases the likelihood of rule-based allocations of the MPDACF. Column 1 presents the main effect of voters’ partisan attachment without any covariates. Without controlling for other factors, the log odds of non-discretionary allocation of the MPDACF increases, on average, by about 0.16 for every percent increase in the concentration of unattached or weakly attached voters.

When we control for the full range of covariates in Column 2, the effect of voters’ partisan attachment remains statistically significant and substantively large. The log odds of rule-based allocation of the MPDACF increases, on average, by nearly 0.45 for every percent increase in the concentration of unattached or weakly attached voters. To provide a more meaningful interpretation of these results, I graph the predicted marginal probabilities of rule-based or non-discretionary distribution of the MPDACF at different levels of concentration of unattached or weakly attached voters holding all other covariates at their mean values. The results, presented in Figure 1, show that the probability of non-discretionary allocations of the MPDACF increases with increasing concentration of unattached or weakly attached voters. This effect is most pronounced between 20 percent and 30 percent concentration of this category of voters. In particular, the likelihood of non-discretionary allocations of the MPDACF is close to 1 (almost certain) as the proportion of less attached voters reaches the 50 percent mark; and it is close zero when the concentration of unattached or weakly attached voters in a district falls below 10 percent.

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19 A test for the proportional odds assumption under ordered logistic regression using the `omodel` command in STATA shows that this assumption is not violated. The p-value of the test statistic for the full model in column 2 is 0.501.
Table 3: Effect of Party Attachment on MPs’ Resource Allocation Strategy

*Dependent variable: MPDACF Allocation Criteria*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>Method: Ordered Logistic</th>
<th>Model 2: Ordered Logistic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent split ticket voters</td>
<td>0.163***</td>
<td>0.451***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.062)</td>
<td>(0.148)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average margin of victory (inverse)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.112)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministerial portfolio</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.042**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.579)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female MP</td>
<td></td>
<td>6.304*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(3.299)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance to district (km)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.057**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP from dominant group</td>
<td></td>
<td>-5.291**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2.199)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent over high school</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.240*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.137)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant cut1</td>
<td>1.913**</td>
<td>7.968**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.961)</td>
<td>(3.288)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant cut2</td>
<td>4.932***</td>
<td>17.025***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.456)</td>
<td>(6.517)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R-squared</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The other important predictors of non-discretionary or rule-based allocations of the MPDACF are ministerial portfolio, distance from the regional capital, and MP ethnicity. MPs who hold ministerial portfolios are significantly more likely to relinquish discretion over allocations of the MPDACF. Ministers of state tend to control a broad range of valued public benefits that they could channel to voters they wish to favor. The MPDACF may therefore be a small part of the resources under their control and it would probably not be a big deal to relinquish control over allocations of these funds. Similarly, allocations of the MPDACF are also more likely to be non-discretionary or rule-based among MPs whose districts are further from the regional capital. These MPs may visit their districts less frequently and it is probably in their interest to have impersonal rules govern allocations of their development funds while they are away. Meanwhile MPs who
are members of the dominant ethnic group in their district are less likely to relinquish discretion over MPDACF allocations. This result is consistent with extant scholarship on ethnic identities and voting behavior in Africa (e.g. Posner 2007; Chandra 2007). As noted earlier, in each district the dominant ethnic group makes up more than 50 percent of the total population. Thus MPs who are from the dominant groups can win an election with the support of only their co-ethnics and as such they may have a greater incentive to favor their co-ethnics in the distribution of benefits.

Finally, allocations of the MPDACF are also more likely to be non-discretionary among MPs from wealthier districts and among female MPs. However, these effects are not significant at conventional levels of statistical significance. That said, the first result is consistent with predictions of standard models of distributive politics: wealthier, more educated voters may be more likely to punish politicians who engage in clientelism or other forms of vote buying (e.g. Kramon 2013; Weitz-Shapiro 2012). Thus politicians in such districts may favor broad-based, non-partisan and more efficient allocations of public benefits. On the effect of gender, perhaps female MPs may be more concerned about poverty and vulnerability among children and women and they may seek to address those issues through rule-based, non-partisan allocations of their development resources.

The main independent variable in the preceding analysis is based on self-reported voting behavior: the proportion of voters in each district who report that they have voted split ticket in past elections and/or intend to do so in future ones. In the following analysis, I replace this measure with one constructed from actual elections results as described above: i.e. the gap in the vote shares between the elected MP and the presidential candidate of his/her party, which is indicative of split ticket voting. A wider
gap means weaker partisan attachment. The results, presented in table 4, are also consistent with my hypothesis. A one-percentage point difference in vote shares between the MP and the presidential candidate of his/her party increases the log of the odd of non-discretionary distribution of the MPDACF by 1.18 on average.

Table 3: Effect of Party Attachment on MPs’ Resource Allocation Strategy

Dependent variable: MPDACF Allocation Criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>Method: Ordered Logistic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average Gap in vote shares</td>
<td>1.182**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.520)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average margin of victory (inverse)</td>
<td>0.235**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.095)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministerial portfolio</td>
<td>0.601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.236)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female MP</td>
<td>2.200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.534)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance to district (km)</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP from dominant group</td>
<td>-2.061**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.918)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent over high school</td>
<td>0.218***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.081)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant cut 1</td>
<td>-0.320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.173)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant cut 2</td>
<td>3.852*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.174)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R-Squared</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Figure 2 plots the predicted probability of non-discretionary allocations of the MPDACF against the average gap in the vote shares between the MP and his/her presidential candidate. In districts where this gap is more than 5 percentage points, the likelihood of non-discretionary allocations of the MPDACF is at least 60 percent, holding all other covariates at their mean values.

Figure 2: Average Gap in Vote Shares and Probability of Non-discretionary Allocations of the MPDACF

Except for the effect of distance, which is negative, small, and statistically insignificant in this specification, the effects of the remaining control variables are largely consistent with the results of the preceding analysis. Allocations of the MPDACF are significantly less likely to be non-discretionary in districts where the MP is a member of the dominant ethnic group whereas in wealthier districts, allocations are more likely to be non-discretionary. The effects of ministerial portfolio and gender (female) remain positive but
statistically insignificant. That of the inverse margin of victory is also positive as in the previous analysis, meaning that MPs who expect close elections are more likely to favor non-discretionary allocations of the MPDACF. But it is statistically significant in this specification.

**Discussion and conclusions**

This paper joins the body of research on the political and policy implications of voter attachments to political parties (e.g. Keefer and Khemani 2009; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). The results show that weak (strong) voter attachment to political parties or candidates increases (decreases) the likelihood of more programmatic forms of public resource allocation by politicians. Broad-based, non-discretionary allocations allow benefits to reach unattached or weakly attached voters, which might influence their voting decisions. Moreover, because unattached or weakly attached voters are more likely to base their voting decisions on the (perceived) performance of incumbent politicians (e.g. Fridy 2007; Weghorst and Lindberg 2013), tying their own hands with impersonal, broad-based distributive rules enables incumbents to broaden their electoral support among unattached voters while simultaneously reducing the risk of an electoral backlash from those attached to the incumbent, particularly those who are relatively less committed to them. These findings shed light on the growing political support for targeted, rule-based public transfers to citizens in developing democracies. These transfers, I argue, enable parties in government to broaden their electoral support among voters who they previously had little electoral support without alienating some of those who have been more loyal to them. However, rule-based transfers would be more likely in contexts where voters evince weak attachment to political parties.
These findings are also consistent with, and important for, understanding the recent line of research that questions the popular view that elections in Africa are inherently clientelist or ethnic (Fridy 2007; Weghorst and Lindberg 2013; Lindberg and Morrison 2008; Bratton 2013). This line of research suggests that voting behavior in Africa is increasingly shaped by perceived performance of incumbent politicians. However, performance-based voting is concentrated among unattached or weakly attached voters, as it is in the U.S. because very loyal voters cannot be attracted by any strategy used by the other party. In other words voters who are not strongly attached to political parties are more likely to base their voting decisions on how they evaluate the performance of incumbent politicians. This implies that in places with large concentrations of unattached or weakly attached voters, politicians would have a greater incentive to signal good performance, especially in the distribution of valued public benefits to citizens.

Finally, for future research, the evidence presented here suggests that voter attachment to political parties is essential when evaluating the impact of constituency development funds (CDFs) on the performance of legislators in new democracies, notably the debate on whether or not legislators’ involvement in grassroots development through the CDFs undermines their investment in oversight and other legislative duties (van Zyl 2010). In places where voters are unattached or weakly attached to political parties, the evidence presented here suggests that legislators would be less likely to engage directly in the management and distribution of CDF benefits to their supporters. But in this context, if voters have information about MPs’ efforts and policy positions, legislators may also have a strong incentive to exert effort in their oversight and legislative duties since their performance is likely to influence voting decisions of some,
if not most of their constituents. Thus a relationship between extent of legislators’ direct involvement in local development through the CDFs and measures of their legislative output is likely to spurious, driven mainly by voter attachments to parties. That is, weak voter attachment to political parties may enhance legislators’ effort in the national capital and simultaneously lower their involvement in grassroots development.
## Appendix

### Table 1: List of Electoral Districts and Code for MPDACF Allocation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Asunafo North</td>
<td>Goaso</td>
<td>Robert Sarfo-Mensah</td>
<td>NPP</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Asunafo South</td>
<td>Kukuom</td>
<td>Eric Opoku</td>
<td>NDC</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
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<td>Benhazin Joseph Dahah</td>
<td>NPP</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>Asutifi South</td>
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<td>Kwabena Twum-Nuamah</td>
<td>NPP</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Berekum West</td>
<td>Berekum</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Dormaa Central</td>
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<td>Kwaku Agyeman-Manu</td>
<td>NPP</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Jaman North</td>
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<td>11</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Kintampo South</td>
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<td>Yaw Effah-Baafi</td>
<td>NDC</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Sene East</td>
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<td>NDC</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
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<td>Kajaji</td>
<td>Kwame Twumasi Amfofo</td>
<td>NDC</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Sunyani East</td>
<td>Sunyani</td>
<td>Kwasi Ameyaw Cheremeh</td>
<td>NPP</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
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<td>Sunyani West</td>
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<td>Ignatius Baffour Awuah</td>
<td>NPP</td>
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<td>NDC</td>
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<td>Wenchi</td>
<td>George Yaw Gyan-Baffour</td>
<td>NPP</td>
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References


